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Fifty years ago, between 1-6 September 1961, twenty-five heads of state and prime 
ministers of the developing world gathered in Belgrade to participate at the first summit of 
the non-aligned states and discuss the relevant global issues and problems trying to provide 
an alternative to the East-West bipolar stand-off. Based on the records of the Foreign 
Office of the United Kingdom, my aim in this article is to analyse the way the Foreign 
Office perceived and evaluated Yugoslavia's role and Yugoslav Premier Josip Broz Tito's 
performance before and during the conference; the short and long range conclusion British 
diplomats deduced from the Belgrade meeting and their concern about how the meeting 
would affect Yugoslav-Western relations. Although the restrictions on the length of this 
article do not allow me to deal with all aspects of the conference in detail, I will also briefly 
touch upon the Foreign Office's attitude to the non-aligned movement in general. As it is 
well known, India and Egypt, leaders of the movement, as well as Yugoslavia, had 
traditionally played an important role in British strategic thinking, but, after 1948 
Yugoslav-British relations also re-developed, as a direct consequence of the the Soviet-
Yugosíav quarrel.1 
Although the escalation of the Cold War after World War II split the world into two 
political, military and ideological blocs, with the emergence of decolonization and the 
gradual dissolution of the former empires, new, powerful forces appeared on the world's 
political stage. The newly independent former African and Asian colonies (17 colonies 
became independent on the black continent in 1960, in the „year of Africa" itself) did not 
want to belong to any of the military blocs. Instead, emphasizing their intention not to join 
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either the Soviet or the American military alliances, they wanted to make a profit out of the 
Soviet-American rivalry. The so called non-aligned movement originated in the early 
1950s, when, on 12 December 1952, 12 African and Asian countries declared their 
independent stance on the East-West conflict. Two years later, on 28 June 1954, Zhou 
Enlai (1949-1976) and Jawarharlal Nehru (1947-1964), the Chinese and the Indian prime 
minister, respectively, defined the five principles of peaceful co-existence (Pancha Sila), 
later amplified in ten points in the final communiqué of the Bandung Conference of twenty-
nine Afro-Asian countries on 24 April 1955.2 During the annual session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1960, the representatives of India, the United Arab 
Republic, Ghana, Indonesia and Yugoslavia urged Soviet party secretary Khrushchev and 
US president John F. Kennedy in a joint proposal to meet as soon as possible.3 The next 
step in the institutionalization of the so called Bandung spirit was the first congress of the 
heads of state and government of the non-aligned movement, that took place in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia. 
Besides the Indian prime minister and the young and vigorous Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
Yugoslav premier Josip Broz Tito also played an important role in the formulation of the 
movement. After the outbreak of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in 1948 and the rapid 
deterioration of the bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet orbit, Stalin 
condemned Tito and the Yugoslav leadership heretic and excommunicated them from the 
Socialist camp. Moreover, as the withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian experts (18-19 
March 1948) coincided with the American and British declaration on Trieste (20 March 
1948) Yugoslavia found itself without allies. Although the Yugoslav leadership formulated 
its new main long term aim in foreign policy, i. e. its equidistance from both the Soviet 
Union and the United States a little later,4 the economic blockade of the Soviet Union and 
the people's democracies, the danger of domestic instability following a severe drought and 
the outbreak of famine in some parts of the country, together with the Soviet war of nerves, 
and the fear from a possible Soviet military attack forced Tito to re-establish contacts with 
the Western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain. Although former 
Yugoslav ambassador to India Josip Djerdja suggested as early as in 1951 that India might 
serve as a way out from isolation for Yugoslavia, and even if Tito immediately identified 
himself with Djerdja's suggestion,5 they had to wait until Stalin's death in 1953 to put this 
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principle into practice. As the new Soviet leadership lowered the pressure on Yugoslavia, 
Tito and the Yugoslav leadership had better prospects for manoeuvring. The Yugoslavs 
took advantage of the increasing scope for action and formulated alliances with numerous 
third world countries between 1954-1959. During the winter of 1954-1955 Tito made a 
long visit to India and Burma, and hosted Nehru and Nasser on the Adriatic island of Brioni 
on 18-19 July 1956. The term non-alignment was created during their discussions there.6 
As a consequence of the deteriorating Soviet-Yugoslav party relations after the Soviet 
troops had suppressed the Hungarian revolution of 1956, Tito turned to the third world 
again and, together with Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno (president of Indonesia between 1945-
1967) endeavoured to operate the movement more efficiently and to give more self-
confidence to enforce their interests.7 He therefore left for a three-month trip in December 
1958 during which he visited Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon (today Sri Lanka), Ethiopia, 
the Sudan and the United Arab Republic. He made a similar trip to Northern and Western 
Africa during the spring of 1961. Having arrived back to Belgrade, he announced the 
convocation of the conference of non-aligned countries. 
The strategists at the Permanent Under-Secretary Department of the Foreign Office 
produced an analysis on the role neutral countries were playing in the Cold War long before 
Tito's announcement. Their confident report, dated 30 January 1961, distinguished between 
neutral and neutralist countries. They used the first, wider category for countries, such as 
Sweden, Ireland and Indonesia, that did not officially belong to any of the superpower blocs 
(neutral states), while the economically underdeveloped countries, often with a colonial 
background, belonged to the other, narrower category (neutralist states). The strategists 
defined the notion of positive neutralism, later widely used by the non-aligned movement, 
as a subcategory of this latter group. The Foreign Office interpreted the term as such an 
active force in international politics, which would 'contract out of the East-West struggle' 
and therefore 'prevent the complete polarisation of the world into two camps'. Although the 
paper frequently described Nasser and Nehru, champions of the neutralist states, as the 
'virulent critics of the West', the analysts did not regard their anti-western stance as an 
inevitable characteristics, partly because their explicit and unambiguous pro-Soviet 
commitment would in itself contradict to the notion of neutralism. Although the paper also 
dealt with the possibility of binding these countries to the Western democratic camp (and 
considered this the most optimistic scenario), the diplomats were realistic enough to 
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consider the long-range independence of the neutralist countries as a fact. They also 
expressed their opinion that British foreign policy should, at least in public, emphasise the 
importance of their independence and neutrality, and the importance of providing sufficient 
educational and technical aid. As a consequence, the report concluded that the neutralist 
bloc 'though it will grow in size and influence, is unlikely ever to become a really cohesive 
force'. It is surprising, though, that this lengthy, nine-page-long report mentioned 
Yugoslavia only once, as an independent Communist state with whom Great Britain 
managed to establish 'reasonably good working relations'.9 
Still, the Foreign Office was the first time thoroughly informed about Tito's intention to 
summon a conference of neutralist states to Yugoslavia on 25 May 1961 from one of the 
telegrams the British embassy in Belgrade sent to London. According to the telegram, a 
British diplomat gathered from a reliable source from the Yugoslav foreign ministry that 
the Yugoslav leadership was thinking about inviting twenty heads of state and government, 
among them four delegations from Latin-America, eight-nine delegations from various 
countries in Africa and the Near East, and three or four delegations from Asia, and wished 
to discuss what positive role neutralist states could play in reducing the tension between the 
American and the Soviet blocs. They also wanted to deal with disarmament and the 
changing role of the United Nations where the Yugoslavs wanted a stronger and more 
lasting cooperation of the member states.10 
At the same time (on 24 and 26 May), the Foreign Office learned from Yugoslav and 
Indian foreign sources that the meeting of the heads of state and government was planned to 
take place sometime at the end of July or early August. Although the British diplomats in 
Belgrade and New Delhi did not exclude the theoretical possibility tKat the conference 
would take place somewhere in Yugoslavia, they found it reasonable that the meeting 
would take place either in Egypt (probably at Alexandria), or in New Delhi or in Bandung, 
Indonesia." British High Commissioner to New Delhi Vincent Coelho gathered from a 
leading Indian diplomat that Nehru, for domestic reasons (because of the coming 
parliamentary elections), was particularly interested in organising the conference in the 
Indian capital.12 Still, the preliminary conference, which opened in Cairo on 5 June decided 
in favour of Yugoslavia, about which British ambassador to the Egyptian capital, Sir 
Harold Beeley (1961-1964) cabled to London on 10 June. Based on the information 
members of the Yugoslav delegation provided him, Beeley expected that the conference 
would take place at the well-known Slovenian resort, Bled,13 but it became evident a few 
9 The National Archives - Public Records Office, London, United Kingdom. Foreign Office: Political 
Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966. (Henceforward: PRO FO) 371/161211 WP 
13/4. 
10PRO FO 371/161211 WP 13/9. 
11 PRO F0371/161211 WP 13/13 and WP 13/14. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also 
expected that the conference would take place in an Egyptian city. National Archives of Hungary. 
Papers of the Foreign Office. Administrative Papers (1945-1964), Yugoslavia. MOL XIX-J-1-k-
Jugoszlavia-1 l/i.-3843/l (box 24). 
12 PRO FO 371/161211 WP 13/13. 
15 PRO FO 371/161212 WP 13/26. 
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days later that meetings would rather take place in the capital, in the building of the federal 
parliament.14 
The many differences, disputes and misunderstandings that occured during the 
preparation of the Belgrade conference reached the British diplomats through different 
sources and through different channels. Based on this information, British diplomats 
reasoned that the differences had two main interconnected sources: how many countries 
should be invited and what views should be presented at the conference. The case of 
Algeria, Cuba and Congo in particular resulted in heated debates. It was one of the most 
important issues on the Cairo preliminary conference of 5-13 June, too, as British 
ambassador Harold Beeley referred about it to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home (1960-1963) in his confident letter on 17 June 1961. According to 
Beeley, the moderate countries, led by India, 'took the view that the concept of non-
alignment should be interpreted as flexible as possible' and intended to use the conference 
as a forum at which 'the major problems confronting the world could be discussed with a 
view to producing constructive suggestions for easing international tension'. On the other 
hand, extremists led by Ghana insisted on 'a narrow and rigid definition of non-alignment' 
reducing the focus of the conference to colonial matters, and wanted to give voice to their 
own regional and particular grievances and were indifferent to other, more global problems 
of the Cold War. Beeley also noticed that the Yugoslav and Indonesian delegations 'adopted 
an attitude of some aloofness', but rendered that 'their sympathies were possibly with the 
Indians'." 
As the time of the conference was approaching, British diplomats took note that the 
Yugoslav government developed a more flexible and more constructive approach to the 
problem. Tito often accepted the moderate Nehru's argument not to let the conference 
"degenerate" into colonial agitation. The British embassy in Belgrade thought on 26 July 
1961 that Tito, having learnt from the failure of the Cairo conference, would in any case 
strengthen the moderate camp. He would certainly be interested in a successful conference, 
both as a host and both as the father of the idea: 'the Yugoslavs are, I think, probably at 
present occupying a fairly central position. [...] The comparatively cautious Yugoslav 
attitude is certainly in part due to the fact that the meeting was, after all, very much their 
own idea, and that they are also the hosts.' According to the British diplomats, this intention 
could be deduced from the fact that the Yugoslavs intended the conference not to be longer 
than five days, which, taking twenty to thirty member countries in account, would 'not 
allow much time for serious discussion'. No doubt, it would reduce the possibility of 
confrontation, too.16 
The British diplomatic records also reveal that British and Yugoslav diplomats met 
more frequently as the date of the conference approached, especially from the middle of 
August. Based on the reports of the British diplomats in Belgrade about their discussions 
with their Yugoslav counterparts, the Foreign Office had the impression that Tito and the 
Yugoslav leadership wanted to put the following topics high on the conference's agenda: 
disarmament, prohibition of nuclear tests, the Soviet proposal for the restructuring of the 
UN and colonialism. The Yugoslav diplomats often elaborated on their view about the 
14 PRO FO 371/161212 WP 13/34. 
15 PRO FO 371/161212 WP 13/37. 
16 PRO FO 371/161215 WP 13/93. 
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German question to the British, which suggests that they were particularly interested in the 
British attitude in this question. The diplomats at the Foreign Office were well aware of that 
fact, too: at the margins on the reports about British-Yugoslav discussions they regularly 
expressed their hope that at least 'some of [the British position] is going to Belgrade'. 7 
Based on the relevant papers of the Foreign Office, the incoming and outgoing 
telegrams of the British delegation to the NATO headquarters in Paris, as well as the 
exchange of letters between the Foreign Office and its foreign representations, I presume 
that the biggest dilemma the British diplomacy was facing at the beginning of the summer 
was how to urge the moderate countries to participate at the conference without being 
accused of trying to influence the outcome of the Belgrade summit. The British diplomats 
repeatedly discussed this question with the United States and their western allies in the 
Political Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty. As British ambassador to NATO Frank 
Stanley Tomlinson (1961-1964) expounded at the meeting on 20 June, Britain and the 
western powers were unable to influence who would be invited to the conference, still, his 
argument went, they should discreetly put some pressure on those already invited: '1 said 
[underlined in the original, V. P.] that the degree to which the Conference would be 
harmful to Western interests would depend on its composition. The composition of the 
Conference would depend in its tum on (a) who received invitations and (b) who accepted 
them. We had no control over the issuing of invitations. It was possible that we could exert 
some influence over the acceptance of invitations.'18 The British diplomacy upheld this 
opinion even if the United States disagreed with it. The Foreign Office, namely, could not 
agree with the American view that even the slightest informal pressure would have harmful 
consequences and considered the American worries about the participation of Cuba and 
other Latin-American countries exaggerated." Therefore, the British diplomats did not 
comprehend the observation of US ambassador to Belgrade George F. Kennan (1961-1963) 
that western powers were interested not in the participation of the moderate countries but 
rather their total absence from the conference. Kennan saw this the only possibility to avoid 
their isolation at a summit where countries with radical views on foreign policy would 
presumably dominate.20 Henceforward, the State Department did not wish to encourage 
other countries either to accept or refuse the invitation. Still, after a partial shift in 
American foreign policy in this matter in early August, it became possible that the British 
representatives, in accordance with their American, French and West German counterparts, 
inform the foreign ministries of those countries that had accepted the invitation on the 
British views concerning those topics that would probably emerge at the agenda of the 
conference.21 . 
17 PRO FO 371/161216 WP 13/102., PRO FO 371/161218 WP 13/145, WP 13/146. and PRO FO 
371/161219 WP 13/175. 
18 PRO FO 371/161212 WP 13/39. 
19 PRO FO 371/161214 WP 13/64 and WP 13/66. 
20 PRO FO 371/161214 WP 13/73. 
21 FO 371/161215 WP 13/98. US president John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) briefly referred to the 
coming summit at his press conference on 31 August. According to British sources, he wanted to 
encourage the moderate states to take a constructive stance at the conference. PRO FO 371/161219 
WP 13/177. 
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The first conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries 
opened in Belgrade on 1 September 1961. Twenty-five countries participated as full 
members and three other countries sent observers.22 The international situation was rather 
tense, which could be felt in the mood of the meetings, too. The Algerian War, which was 
in full swing (negotiations between the National Liberation Front (FNL) and the French 
government on the outcome of the war re-started in May 1961),23 directly affected many 
African countries that had recently become independent; the disastrous landing attempt at 
the Bay of Bigs between 17-19 April 1961 failed to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime; the 
East German communist regime started to erect the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 creating 
another possibility for direct confrontation between the superpowers; and, finally, shortly 
before the conference commenced, on 31 August 1961, the Soviet leadership unilaterally 
denounced the moratorium signed in October 1959 between the United States, Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union and declared its intention to resume nuclear testing. 
The British embassy in Belgrade regularly reported on the details of the conference. 
Moreover, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia, Michael Justin Creswell (1960-1964) 
prepared three detailed and elaborated summaries after the summit had concluded. One was 
written about the proceedings of the conference itself, the other on the role Yugoslavia 
played at the conference and the third on the possible effects of the conference on neutralist 
states and the non-aligned movement.24 
In his full and detailed summary on the work of the conference, written on 12 
September, Creswell emphasized that the Yugoslavs, as the host nation, carefully arranged 
the facilities and its surroundings for the conference. By leaps and bounds, roads were 
widened and received concrete surface, the proprietors were requested to repair and clean 
their dwellings, flowers were planted along the roads, to mention just a few improvements. 
Dedinje, a posh Belgrade neighbourhood, where most of the delegations were 
accommodated, got a new electric public lightning. Twenty-eight speeches were made at 
the opening section of the summit, lasting for three days. Among those delivered, Creswell 
'without doubt' considered Nehru's moderate speech the most important both in his short 
telegrams sent after each speech and both in his summary. The Indian premier stressed that 
the most important task of the conference should be to give a positive response to the 
tensions in the world without preparing a concrete and detailed solution: 'Nehru [...] then 
followed with an eloquent plea that the dominant note of the conference should be to devote 
itself to taking some positive action to meet the present danger of war, to which every other 
22 Apart from the participants of the preliminary conference in Cairo, eight other heads of state or 
government were invited. Among them Nigeria, Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso), Togo and Mexico 
declined to participate, while Bolivia, Ecuador and Brazil sent observers to Belgrade. The only state 
that expected and therefore accepted the invitation was Lebanon. Later Cyprus and Tunisia were also 
invited. The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo received an invitation while the 
conference had already been in progress. PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/287. 
23 It is worth mentioning that Yugoslavia, Ghana, Cambodia and Afghanistan used the conference to 
announce the de jure recognition of the Temporary Government of the Republic of Algeria led by 
Benn Hedda. It was further affirmed by the 3rd point of the joint communiqué. J. NAGY LÁSZLÓ: AZ 
algériai háború 1954-1962 [The Algerian War, 1954-1962]. Szeged, Universitas Szeged Kiadó, 
2010. 268. 
24 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/286., WP 13/287. and WP 13/298. 
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question must be considered secondary. It seemed that in some quarters the real meaning of 
nuclear warfare was not fully grasped, the world continued to re-arm. There was no choice 
left but that between negotiation and war, and the conference should use its full influence to 
ensure that the Great Powers should not be too rigid to negotiate. [...] the conference 
should not make detailed proposals or propose detailed solutions for the matters in dispute, 
as this might only hinder the process of negotiation.' The Indian statesman expressed his 
opinion on the Berlin question in a similarly restrained way. He thought that only two 
options were possible: '(a) the existence of two Germanies and (b) the need of access for 
Berlin.' According to him, the only real and lasting solution would be complete 
disarmament but he did not consider it possible at the given circumstances.25 Therefore, he 
regarded the real task of the conference to urge the American and the Soviet leadership to 
continue their negotiations. Besides Nehru, British ambassador Michael Creswell regarded 
U Nu's 'thoughtful and philosophical speech'26 only worthy of a statesman even if he 
considered Nasser's speech 'surprisingly moderate' and emphasized that it dealt with a wide 
array of things and the need to reduce tensions in the world.27 
Unlike the above mentioned speeches, not only the British ambassador but the British 
diplomats in London, too, were disappointed at Tito's second speech, which was delivered 
on 3 September. In his speech, the Yugoslav president supported Khrushchev's suggestions 
considering the recognition of East Germany, the Odera-Neisse rivers as border between 
Germany and Poland, and the German peace treaty, and strongly criticized the re-armament 
of West Germany. Moreover, he did not condemn the Soviet Union for announcing its 
intention to resume nuclear testing. Although he did find the coincidence unfortunate, Tito 
thought it totally understandable as the French were carrying out similar tests in the Sahara. 
Creswell was particularly surprised by the restrained Yugoslav reaction because the 
spokesman of the Yugoslav ministry of foreign affairs referred to the Soviet move as 
"brutal' in his first response to the announcement.28 The Yugoslavs could not hide the fact 
from the British diplomats, either, that during the reception of the guests at Batajnica 
airport on 31 August Soviet ambassador to Belgrade Aleksei Episev met Tito on Soviet 
request. Moreover, diplomatic circles at the Yugoslav capital whispered about a second 
meeting between Tito and the Soviet ambassador that might have taken place either on 1 or 
2 September.29 In all likelihood, diplomats from other countries were also curious as several 
theories circulated, from which Creswell pointed out the commentary of the Croat prime 
minister Vladimir Bakaric as a possible explanation. According to Bakarié, Tito wanted to 
back Khrushchev against hard liners in Soviet military leadership. But the British diplomat 
did not give credit to this rumour.30 
Conversely, it was obvious for both the British and the Yugoslav diplomats that Tito 
went too far in his speech. The fact that the Yugoslav chargé d'affairs to London DuhaÔek 
was compelled to enter into explanations also confirms this. During lunch with senior 
25 PRO FO 371/161220 WP13/186. 
26 PRO FO 371/161220 WP13/185. 
27 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/287. 
28 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/286. 
29 Some diplomats thought that the Soviet ambassador might conveyed Khrushchev's personal 
message to Tito. PRO FO 371/161226 WP13/286. 
30 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/286. 
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British diplomat Crispin Tickell, he did not miss the opportunity to mention that Tito "had 
been shocked as anyone else at the Russian decision', but 'felt it necessary to strike some 
sort of balance between East and West'. So that was the real reason behind his criticism of 
the French nuclear tests. In order to support his argument, Duhaôek underlined that Tito, 
while strongly criticized the colonial powers, Tiad specifically excluded the United 
Kingdom, whose record he admired and whose responsibility towards the people formerly 
or still under their charge he well understood'. Moreover, Yugoslavia welcomed the British-
American joint proposal of 3 September on the prohibition of nuclear tests, in the 
atmosphere, though, lie thought it highly unlikely that the Russians would accept it'. Still, 
the Yugoslav diplomat was unable to dispel the British fears. Therefore, the Foreign Office 
put all their trust in Nehru and hoped that the Indian statesman had enough influence and 
the moderates would prevail.31 
The fears of the Foreign Office were not without foundation. During the closed sessions 
that started on 3 September, the delegations made a rather slow progress in formulating the 
joint communiqué and the lurmonization of different standpoints was accompanied by 
numerous heated debates. The British diplomats could gather only little reliable information 
about the proceedings of the closed sessions as British ambassador Michael Creswèll 
admitted it in his urgent and confident cypher telegram to the Foreign Office on 4 
September. According to the telegram, the ambassador learnt from confident sources that 
the committee, whose task was to draft the joint communiqué, was divided into two sub-
committees. One of them, which was led by Ghana, dealt with the main elements of the 
actual crisis (Berlin, nuclear tests, disarmament), while the other sub-committee discussed 
the long term problems (structural changes in the UN, colonization). Members of the 
conference dissented on the best way to present the resolutions of the conference to 
Khruschew and US President John F. Kennedy. Nehru, who was about to leave for 
Moscow, was rather reluctant in accepting the request and nobody was willing to deliver it 
to Washington at all. According to Creswell, at last the delegations decided to convey the 
message through regular diplomatic channels.32 An open sign of misunderstandings was 
connected to Tunesian president Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987) who did not turn up at the 
closing session on 6 September and left the conference without fore-warning. At the airport, 
the secretary of the Tunesian embassy had an open row with Tito and then Bourguiba let 
his passion run away with him and used improper words after the captain of his plane 
forwarded Tito's farewell message, as it was required by protocol.33 
With regard to the success of the conference, Creswell himself was in doubts, as it is 
clearly reflected in his above mentioned telegram of 4 September, and questioned whether 
the conference would finish its agenda by 5 September as it was originally planned. Nehru's 
insistence to leave for Moscow as scheduled added further to his worries because it was the 
Indian senior diplomat Ratan Kumar Nehru who was to lead the Indian delegation in 
Nehru's absence and he continued to be rather pessimistic considering the outcome of the 
conference.34 
31 PRO FO 371/161221 WP 13/212. The official English version of the final communiqué does not 
contain Tito's post-entry on Soviet nuclear tests. PRO FO 371/161228 WP 13/345. 
32 PRO FO 371/161221 WP 13/210. 
33 PRO FO 371/161224 WP 13/250G. 
34 PRO FO 371/161221 WP 13/210. 
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Regardless of these events, the British diplomats both in Belgrade and in London 
considered the final declaration and the short statement entitled Danger of War and Appeal 
for Peace of 6 September35 a victory for the moderate participants. They were delighted 
that the delegates behaved more sensibly than they had previously expected it. The Soviet 
Union failed to put pressure on the conference by resuming its nuclear tests and the 
participants stoutly rejected the Soviet plans for establishing a third bloc.36 1 must mention 
here that Creswell and another British diplomat at the Belgrade embassy, Dennis D. Brown 
in particular drew the attention of the Foreign Office to a question of terminology: while 
western readers referred to the notion bloc, as a political grouping, the participants at the 
conference used it in a military sense: The point is that to a Western reader (and perhaps to 
an Eastern reader as well) the term "bloc" [underlined in the original, V. P.] implies a 
political grouping. The non-aligned countries clearly aspire to form a distinct political 
group of their own, but say that they "do not wish to form a bloc [underlined in the original, 
V. P.] and cannot be a bloc [underlined in the original, V. P.]." [...] Thus there is at first 
sight an inconsistency. However, for the countries represented at Belgrade, the blocs 
[underlined in the original, V. P.], whether Eastern or Western, are not primarily political 
but military groupings.'37 
Despite the positive outcome of the final communiqué, Creswell referred to it in his 
summary as such a document that 'conspicuously lacks the virtues of clarity and 
conciseness while enshrining a number of interesting ideas'. Generally speaking, he still did 
not consider it dangerous to western interests.38 
In the other two summaries, Creswell examined what possible effect the Belgrade 
summit had on neutrality in general and on Yugoslav foreign policy in particular. He 
reckoned that a wide range of views were presented at the conference and there was 'no 
common ideology [that] can be claimed to unite them'. He thought it entirely reasonable as 
'they represented every form of society and institutions from the medieval monarchies of 
Yemen and Ethiopia to the modern revisionist Marxism of Communist Yugoslavia'. The 
countries were different from one other in population, wealth and importance. Moreover, 
'save from the Arabs, no ties of joint defence linked any of the participants'. The only 
common feature was their anti-colonial stance and that 'they were all, in greater or less 
degree, in need of rapid economic development'. Although the extravagance that 
accompanied the conference (illuminated public spaces, repainted façades just like 
Potiemkin villages) had surely impressed the local public opinion, Creswell considered 
Tito's performance as an obvious failure, even if he supposed that the Yugoslav statesman 
strengthened the moderate delegates at the closed sessions. He outlined that 'Tito has 
seriously maned the image which he had previously sought to create by speaking as he did'. 
According to the British ambassador, western press gave a critical reception to Tito's 
speech and only a few of his ideas were incorporated in the final version of the 
35 For excerpts from the Belgrade Declaration see: Summit Declarations of Non-Aligned Movement 
(1961-2009). Kathmandu, Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2011. 1-6. Available: 
http://www.ifa.org.nD/pdgDeclaration%20of%20nam.pdf. Retrieved on 19 January 2012. 
36 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/287. 
37 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/298 6s WP 13/299. 
38 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/287. 
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communiqué. He correctly supposed the deterioration of US-Yugoslav relations, too.39 He 
had to admit that 'the closest working relationship has been established between Presidents 
Tito and Nasser', but regardless of the obvious signs of misunderstanding between the 
moderates and the radicals, the Yugoslavs managed to preserve their good relations with 
both groups. Moreover, secret meetings might have also taken place during the breaks of 
the conference, as Creswell referred to it in his summary. The fact that Tito's personal staff 
was the most active on the night from 6 to 7 September might have been a clear sign of it as 
Creswell indicated. He guessed that Tito's meeting with Nehru and Sukarno might have 
taken place then.40 
With regard to the impact of the conference on Great Britain and British foreign policy, 
Creswell's analysis shows a rather ambiguous picture. The British ambassador outlined that 
one should not take the outcome of the conference 'permanent and definite'. Although he 
did not suppose that the underlining ideological principles of the non-aligned movement 
would significantly change in the near future, Creswell took it for granted that their 
application 'to specific cases seems likely to vary considerably according to circumstances'. 
(From a western point of view he considered this the most dangerous scenario.) 
Presumably, they could count on some sympathy in colonial matters (he too considered the 
lack of open criticism of British colonial policy worthy of attention), while the participants 
'would like to compose Great-Power differences. They see themselves not as judges, but as 
conciliators. As such they must perforce aim at conciliation on some mean between the two 
extremes.' Despite their effort to be objective, it can easily happen that they accidentally 
became 'co-belligerent on the Communist side'. This, so goes Creswell's argument, the 
British must accept as a fact: 'We may not like these activities but they, and their authors, 
are a fact of life which we cannot disregard, and which we shall have to live'. The main task 
of British diplomacy, according to the ambassador, was to explore the given possibilities. 
They had to establish working relations with as many non-aligned countries as possible. 
(Paradoxically, he considered the British imperial history as an advantage there.) In order to 
achieve these aims, patience was highly needed: 'In the main, however, we shall have to 
rely upon much patience, and on the recognition that neutralist views, though frequently 
inconvenient to ourselves, and often coloured by selfish interests are, in the majority of 
cases, sincerely held."41 
In London, the Foreign Office reached similar conclusions as it can be deduced from the 
confident telegram sent by Crispin Tickell to the British delegation at the NATO 
headquarters in Paris on 25 September 1961. In this telegram, Tickell gave instructions to 
the British delegation for the next meeting of the Political Committee on the following day 
39 After the conference had ended, the United States communicated its disapproval to Yugoslavia in a 
sharp note. The Yugoslavs rejected the American argument in a similarly sharp note and disclaimed 
the American's right to interfere with their domestic affairs. PRO FO 371/161226 WP13/286. One 
must also note that the stance of the American diplomacy was not uniform. US ambassador George F. 
Kennan, who remained highly critical of the Yugoslav foreign policy, privately informed the British 
ambassador to Belgrade on 1 November that the State Department was divided. According to the 
American diplomat, the department dealing with Eastern Europe was optimistic without reason. PRO 
FO 371/161228 WP13/328. 
40 PRO FO 371/161226 WP 13/298. 
41 PRO FO 371/161226 WP13/298. 
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and emphasized that the heads of state and government present at the Belgrade summit (or 
at least those whose countries became independent much earlier) behaved more sensible 
than previously expected. Whatever they said in front of the public, they objected the 
resume of Soviet nuclear testing and opposed the Soviet plans for reorganizing the UN. 
Tickell expressed his appreciation for Nehru's positive role. He thought that Britain should 
be grateful to him for the 'relative mild' wording of the peace declaration and the 'relatively 
harmless' character of the declaration.42 
Still, 1 must argue based on the papers of the Foreign Office that Britain, too, was 
offended by Tito's speech, even if to a somewhat milder degree than the United States. The 
confident note on the talks Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath (1960-1963), later prime 
minister (1970-1974), had with Tito on 15 November 1961 during Heath's visit in 
Yugoslavia confirms this. Namely, the Foreign Office disapproved of the Yugoslav 
apologies about Tito's speech and criticized the Yugoslav method of adopting a certain 
'double standards to the actions of East and West'.43 
Neither the British, nor the American resentment could crush the non-aligned 
movement. Tito visited Cairo as early as 18-19 November 1961 to hold talks with Nasser 
and Nehru, who was on his way home to India from Washington.44 The first Yugoslav 
foreign minister, Ko6a Popovic visited several Latin-American countries in May 1962 and 
prepared the way for Tito's one month tour in September 1963 45 Finally, the next 
conference of the non-aligned states took place between 5-10 October 1964 in Cairo, which 
has been followed by 14 other conferences so far. The latest was held again in Belgrade 
between 5-6 September 2011 commemorating the 50th anniversary of the movement. 
42 PRO FO 371/161227 WP 13/303. In the end, the Political Committee of NATO discussed the 
Belgrade summit during its meeting on 5 October. At the meeting Tomlinson closely followed 
Tickell's instructions. The French and the Italian delegate expressed similar views, but the Italian 
ambassador mentioned that the participants would surely be more confident after the conference and 
would think that they could influence the two blocs in some ways or other. PRO FO 371/161227 WP 
13/309. 
43 PRO FO 371/161228 WP 13/330. With the expression of „double standard" the Foreign Office 
referred to the speech of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Douglas-Home at the House 
of Lords on 17 October, in which he mentioned the following in reference to the Belgrade summit: 
'[The participants of the conference] know perfectly well, particularly the Afro-Asian countries, that 
we have given independence to 600 million peoples in the last few years, and that that process 
continues rapidly. Yet resolution after resolution is framed and passed condemning the United 
Kingdom as colonialist, and there is never a protest against the Russian conduct of their own empire, 
which consists of one occupied country after another.' The Foreign Secretary also referred to Tito 
speech on 3 September: I heard one speech from the representative of a country to whom we have 
given a great deal of assistance saying that the technical aid agreements could be as bad as the old 
colonialism' Hansard, House of Lord Reports, 17 October 1961. 336. hasáb. Forrás: 
^ttp / / h a n « a r t 1 mi11hanksvstem.com/lords/1961/oct/17/foreign-affairs. retrived: 27 November 2011. 
44 PRO FO 371/161228 WP 13/336. 
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